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6 Semi-Colonialism and Cultural Interaction:
Chinese Indentured Labor in World War One France
and the Sino-French Connection
Paul J. Bailey
Introduction
During World War One, beginning in 1916, nearly 140,000 Chinese la-
borers (mainly from the northern province of Shandong) were re-
cruited by the British and French governments to make up for labor
shortages in France, as well as to release British dockworkers in France
for military duty. Although the French government looked principally
to its formal colonies and protectorates for labor manpower during the
war (recruiting 78,566 Algerians; 48,955 Vietnamese; and 35,506 Mor-
occans, for example), it imported nearly 37,000 Chinese workers.
Those recruited by Britain constituted a larger proportion of its over-
seas labor force used in France; organized into 195 ‘labor battalions’
and designated the Chinese Labor Corps, Chinese workers totalled
96,000 (compared to 48,000 Indians and 21,000 South African
blacks) (Cross 1980: 615-616; 1983: 35-36; Summerskill 1982: 163;
Horne 1985: 59). During their sojourn in France, these Chinese work-
ers were involved in a wide variety of war-related work such as unload-
ing goods and raw materials (e.g. coal) in the coastal docks, transporta-
tion, armaments and munitions production, machinery and equipment
maintenance, road and aerodrome construction and even burial of the
war dead.
In addition to sanctioning the British and French recruitment of
Chinese labor in 1916-1918, the Chinese government in Beijing itself
formally declared war on Germany in August 1917 (the only concrete
consequence of which was the sequestration of German property and
shipping in China). Together, these two acts earned China the right to
attend the Versailles Peace Conference at the end of the war. China’s
participation in the conference, in effect, symbolized for the first time
during the modern era the western powers’ acquiescence in China’s
membership of the international community following a century of re-
peated humiliations at the hands of western powers (and latterly Japan)
determined to enhance their economic, commercial and territorial pri-
vileges in the country. In many ways by the early twentieth century
China had become – in the later words of Mao Zedong – a ‘semi-col-
ony’, the ‘victim’ of an informal imperialism by means of which the
privileges held by foreigners and their governments in China impinged
upon the country’s sovereignty and limited its freedom of action. Such
a ‘colonial’ status was ironically demonstrated during the French re-
cruitment of Chinese labor in 1916-1917; Chinese workers were cate-
gorised together with workers from the French colonies and placed un-
der the administrative supervision of the Service d’organisation des tra-
vailleurs coloniaux (Colonial Labor Service).
Chinese hopes in 1919 for a new era of international relations in
which China would be treated as an equal ultimately foundered on the
rocks of realpolitik, as the Versailles Peace Treaty neither compelled Ja-
pan to return to China the leasehold territory of Jiaozhou (Shandong
province) that it had seized from Germany in 1914, nor amended in
any substantial way the ‘unequal treaty system’ in China. China’s only
gains from its contribution to the allied cause in World War One were
the postponement of Boxer Indemnity payments for five years, and a
slight increase allowed in import tariff levels. Decisions taken by the
big powers at Versailles thus seemed to confirm China’s status as the
helpless (and hapless) victim of western and Japanese imperialism
(further demonstrated by the fact that the anti-Chinese legislation so
prevalent in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand before World
War One continued unabated after 1918). Not surprisingly, the story of
Chinese indentured labor in World War One France has slipped into a
historical black hole – in the West because of the conventionally Euro-
centric approach often adopted by western historians of World War
One, and in China because it represents simply another shameful and
humiliating episode in the western exploitation of China during the
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries and therefore does
not merit any in-depth study.
This chapter will argue that the history of Chinese indentured labor
in World War One France should be placed within significantly larger
contexts. Not only was it an important episode in the longer history of
Chinese worker migration that began in the mid-nineteenth century
with the illegal ‘coolie trade’ carried out in China’s treaty ports, but it
also illuminates in very interesting ways Sino-French mutual percep-
tions and cultural interaction during the first two decades of the twenti-
eth century. Such interaction, and the fact that Chinese politicians and
intellectuals were active participants in the recruitment (and that they
invested the project with their own political, social and cultural agenda)
impels us to view China as a more autonomous actor on the world
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stage at this time than has hitherto been assumed in the general his-
tories of modern China. Finally, the chapter suggests that the specifi-
cally political use made by the Chinese government in 1916-1918 of
Chinese overseas workers intriguingly anticipates the attitude and prac-
tices of the new Chinese Communist regime after 1949, especially in
its relations with Africa.
Chinese support for the recruitment
Active Chinese support and participation clearly distinguishes the
French recruitment of Chinese workers during World War One from
the unregulated and illegal ‘coolie trade’ of the nineteenth century,
when up to 500,000 Chinese were recruited principally to work on su-
gar plantations in South America and the Caribbean (intriguingly, a
note from the French Foreign Ministry in 1863 suggested recruiting
Chinese men and their families from central Chinese provinces to cul-
tivate cotton and cereals in France’s African colonies).1 Both the French
and British recruitment of Chinese workers in 1916-1917 were based
on regulations first drawn up by the Qing government in 1866 (and
originally rejected by the British and French governments) that im-
posed a time limit on the indenture, insisted on transparency of con-
tracts (texts to be openly published in the Chinese press and to specify
clearly duration, wage rates and number of working hours), guaranteed
free medical assistance and free passage home after the expiry of the
contract, and provided for the stationing of Chinese official inspectors
both at the embarkation ports in China and in France to oversee the
Chinese workers’ welfare.
Two main Chinese constituencies were involved in the support for
the recruitment of Chinese labor in World War One France. The first
included government and official elites, who responded enthusiastically
to the French request for Chinese labor in late 1915 in order to enhance
China’s standing at a future peace conference. In fact, President Yuan
Shikai – in order to forestall the Japanese takeover of Germany’s con-
cession area in Shandong province (Japan had declared war on Ger-
many in 1914 as Britain’s ally) – had proposed (without success) Chi-
na’s military participation in the war on the side of the entente powers
as soon as war had begun (Chi 1970: 20,72; Lo 1976: 2.559-561). On
two further occasions, in 1915 and 1917, the Chinese government pro-
posed sending troops to the Dardanelles and the Western Front respec-
tively (La Fargue 1937: 83-84; Chi 1970: 129-130). Significantly, while
the British and American governments were not especially keen on the
proposals (mainly for logistical and financial reasons, but also because
of a lack of confidence in the potential usefulness of Chinese military
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participation) both the French government and military were. Joint pro-
posals drawn up by the French and Chinese governments in the spring
of 1918 (before the definitive shelving of any such plan for Chinese
military participation in March) would have provided for the financing
of a Chinese expeditionary force comprising 43 battalions (1,543 offi-
cers and 44,900 troops) and additional special units such as ‘police
contingents’, ‘sanitation brigades’ and ‘communications teams’.2
A second, and perhaps more intriguing, Chinese constituency in fa-
vor of the recruitment was a group of Francophile intellectuals and
educators who cultivated extensive links with both Chinese political fig-
ures and French official and intellectual circles. Since the early years of
the twentieth century, in fact, this Chinese Francophile ‘lobby’ had
been energetically promoting Sino-French cultural relations and the
importance of Chinese overseas study in France. The most prominent
member of this group was Li Shizeng (1881-1973), son of a Qing court
official and who himself had gone to France in 1902 as an ‘embassy
student’. While there he enrolled in the Ecole Pratique d’Agriculture in
Montargis (just outside Paris) and later, in 1905, studied chemistry and
biology at the Institut Pasteur in Paris. Other members of this Franco-
phile lobby included anti-Qing revolutionaries and future prominent
figures of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) in the 1920s – Cai Yuan-
pei (1868-1940), Wu Zhihui (1864-1953) and Zhang Jingjiang (1877-
1950) – all of whom were in France at the same time as Li. Li Shizeng
became a fervent admirer of French culture (which included French
anarchism) and often contrasted the ‘worthy’ ideals of the French secu-
lar republic, which he described as representing ‘freedom’, ‘creativity’
and ‘pacifism’, with the apparently more ‘brutal’ German ideals of
‘autocracy, utilitarianism and militarism’. While in Paris Li built up a
wide network of contacts with French politicians and intellectuals, as
well as helping to publish a Chinese-language anarchist journal, Xin
shiji (New Century). Li also opened a night school for the Chinese
workers he had recruited after 1908 for employment in the beancurd
factory he had established in Garenne-Colombes outside Paris. For Li,
France was a republic par excellence, free of what he perceived as the
‘baneful’ influences of monarchy and religion – and thus an ideal en-
vironment in which to work and study. In 1912, on his return to China,
he founded the Association for Frugal Study in France (liufa jianxue-
hui), which helped send nearly 100 Chinese students to France before
the outbreak of World War One. In the same year Cai Yuanpei, who
had become the first minister of education in the new Chinese Repub-
lic, asserted that the French revolutionary ideals of freedom, equality
and universal brotherhood were comparable to such Confucian values
of ren (sense of compassion, humaneness) (Cai n.d.).
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The Sino-French connection and mutual perceptions
The French intellectuals and politicians with whom Li came into con-
tact were equally admiring of China; their inclination to link the tradi-
tions of French and Chinese cultures represented, in effect, a unique
aspect of general western attitudes towards China in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Of course, in many ways French
diplomats and officials at home and in China shared the same assump-
tions of western superiority and the imperative of the western ‘civiliz-
ing mission’ as their British, American or German counterparts. How-
ever, what set French attitudes apart was the assumption that France
was the one European country that could act as an effective mediator
between China and the West. This was not only because France per-
ceived itself as more sensitive to, and appreciative of, Chinese culture
but also because it was assumed in many ways that French and Chinese
cultures had much in common. Subscribers to these views included so-
cialist politicians such as Marius Moutet and Edouard Heriot, scholar-
politicians such as Paul Painleve´ and prominent academics such as the
historian Alphonse Aulard.3
What gave urgency to the French insistence that France’s role in Chi-
na was uniquely different from that of other western powers was an in-
creasing fear that China was inexorably falling under the sway of An-
glo-Saxon cultural influence, a consequence of Britain’s predominant
economic presence in China. In their effort to counter such an influ-
ence, French officials, politicians, intellectuals and scholars sought to
emphasize a complementarity between French and Chinese cultures.
Thus in its respect for learning, secularism, joie de vivre and aversion to
war, French culture was seen to complement the humanist values of
Confucius. Even the central role of the family in Chinese society found
an echo in the Frenchman’s respect for family life. As the president of
the Franco-Chinese Friendship Association (Association amicale franco-
chinoise),4 Georges Dubail (a former minister to China) noted in 1907:
The Chinese and French are profound and wise philosophers;
they are equally good family men (bons pe`res de famille), prudent
businessmen and faithful associates.5
The idea that the French and Chinese characters were alike in their
proclivity for hard work, down-to-earth wisdom and practice of family
virtues was reiterated in 1911 by another president of the Association,
Georges Ducrocq:
Of all the foreigners who are in China, there are few more cap-
able of adapting to China’s way of life than the Frenchman. Like
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us, the Chinese take a delight in family life; like us, they have
an appetite for work and a moralistic turn of mind, a practical
wisdom for daily life… that you will find in Confucius as in La
Fontaine.6
For Ducrocq, only France could play the intermediary role between the
West and China precisely because of the cultural affinity the two coun-
tries shared. It would be hard to imagine a British diplomat or scholar
(or an American, for that matter) of the time describing Sino-British re-
lations (or Sino-American relations) in quite the same way.
Li Shizeng and others of the Francophile ‘lobby’ not surprisingly
welcomed the prospect of France’s recruitment of Chinese labor in
1916 as part of their larger cultural and social agenda. Li confidently
predicted that enormous benefits would accrue to China, as Chinese la-
borers in France would form the vanguard of an educated workforce
contributing to the diffusion of industrial skills and reform of society
on their return.7 While in France, Li claimed, Chinese workers would
become truly ‘civilized’, divesting themselves of their ‘backward’ and
‘unseemly’ habits and customs. At the opening meeting of the Sino-
French Education Association (Huafa jiaoyuhui) that Li had helped cre-
ate in 1916 with the help of prominent French intellectuals such as Al-
phonse Aulard to promote the expansion of Sino-French cultural rela-
tions, the affinities between Chinese and French cultures were again
highlighted. Aulard himself, echoing Cai Yuanpei’s earlier observation,
declared that the humanist philosophy of Confucius anticipated the
ideals of the French Revolution.8 Two years later, a French military offi-
cial in China on a government mission to explore ways of enhancing
French cultural influence in the country, confidently proclaimed:
The Chinese is a philosopher, poet and artist, and it is for this
reason one says that he is the Frenchman of the Far East.9
The Chinese worker experience in World War One France
Significantly, however, actual French attitudes towards the indentured
Chinese workers during World War One, especially among officials
and employers, undermined (and belied) the grandiose Gallic rhetoric
of Sino-French cultural affinity. Mention has already been made of the
fact that Chinese workers were rather unceremoniously lumped to-
gether with workers from France’s colonies and placed under the ad-
ministrative control of the Colonial Labor Service. In the eyes of French
official authorities (as well as their British counterparts), Chinese work-
ers were often perceived and described in condescending terms as
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either ‘childlike’ or ‘malleable’. More intriguingly, there was always an
underlying fear of a ‘loss of face’ on the part of French authorities vis-
a`-vis the Chinese workers, a concern that revealed more about French
feelings of insecurity than anything else. Instructions from the Colo-
nial Labor Service to potential French employers of Chinese workers in
September 1916 perfectly illustrated this French obsession with
‘face’:10
The Chinese have considerable self-pride (amour-propre), and it
is therefore appropriate to treat them with kindness, and give
them a reward, however, minimal, every time they try to do
something well. An act of brutality will bring the opposite of
what is intended, since anyone giving in to anger will lose all
credibility in their eyes... It is imperative that employers, fore-
men, etc., realize that in the view of the Chinese, to give in to
an external manifestation of anger is proof of an inability to con-
trol oneself and thus (in the eyes of the Chinese) to remain a
barbarian.11
Furthermore, because indentured Chinese workers did not, in fact, be-
have in ways expected of them (i.e., to be ‘docile’, ‘passive’, ‘hardwork-
ing’), by 1918 French employers had become increasingly hostile to the
idea of employing them. Chinese workers often protested against
breaches of their contracts, the dangerous nature of their work, and
the harsh treatment they at times received. In some cases Chinese
workers, such as those at a munitions plant in St. Louis de Rhoˆne
(near Arles) simply walked off the job when refused overtime pay and
headed for the port of Marseille. At dockyards such as Saint-Nazaire
French employers continually criticized Chinese workers as ‘lazy trou-
blemakers’ who refused to unload coal because they considered such a
task unsafe (and not part of their contract). In some cases, disputes be-
tween Chinese workers and French soldiers (as happened in Rouen in
March 1918) could lead to violence.12 Dissatisfaction with the ‘unruly’
Chinese workers had reached such a fever pitch by 1918 that the Minis-
try of War was referring to them as ‘undesirables’. At the end of the
war meetings held by representatives of the Ministry of War, Ministry
of Justice and local army commands actually discussed complaints sent
in from local communities (especially from the Somme region and the
Pas de Calais) about the Chinese workers in their midst. Such com-
plaints referred to crimes ‘of all sorts’ and suggested that in certain vil-
lages local people no longer ‘felt safe’ and were contemplating quitting
their village unless the Chinese workers were withdrawn.13
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Conclusion
The story of Chinese indentured labor in World War One France ended
in disappointment and recrimination. As mentioned, the Versailles
Peace Treaty ultimately confirmed China’s status as a minor player on
the world stage and continued acceptance of sovereignty-undermining
foreign privilege in the country itself. Furthermore, the ambitious
plans of the Chinese Francophile lobby (of which Chinese indentured
labor in France would have constituted an element) to strengthen and
expand Sino-French cultural relations never came to fruition. The hos-
tility towards Chinese workers by French employers and local commu-
nities exposed the hypocrisy of French rhetoric concerning a ‘special re-
lationship’ between China and France (there is an interesting parallel
here with the sorry plight of Chinese immigrants in the United States
set against the context of an American discourse that highlighted a
‘special relationship’ between the US and China based on the former’s
genuine desire to ‘help’ and ‘assist’ the latter) (Hunt 1983).
Yet three little-known events in the wake of World War One indicate
that though China may indeed have been a ‘semi-colony’ during the
first decades of the twentieth century, Sino-French interaction at this
time (what I call the ‘Sino-French connection’) could proceed in two di-
rections. In September 1919, while Chinese Foreign Minister Lu Cheng-
xiang (1871-1949) was in France attending the Versailles Peace Confer-
ence, he met French President Raymond Poincare´; as a gesture of sup-
port for an impoverished France and to demonstrate China’s civilized
commitment to education, Lu donated 50,000 francs on behalf of the
Chinese government to help restore educational facilities in war-shat-
tered Verdun.14 This was not the only assistance China provided
France; two years later, at the height of the postwar economic depres-
sion in France, the Chinese government sent food relief in the shape
of 400 tons of eggs.15 In 1920, when Paul Painleve´ visited China to
confer on President Xu Shichang an honorary D.Litt. degree from the
University of Paris, he was in turn offered 100,000 francs as a Chinese
contribution to the newly created Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises in
Paris (and thereby hoping to enhance interest in Chinese culture in
France). Finally, post-1949 Chinese historiography may have consigned
the story of Chinese indentured labor in World War One France to the
dustbin because it was seen to represent simply another example of
China’s exploitation by the western powers, but in one fascinating re-
spect the approach adopted by the Chinese Republican government
during World War One in its support for the sending of Chinese work-
ers to France has parallels with the foreign policy of the post-1949
Maoist state. Chinese government officials in their discussions with
French and British authorities in 1916 made a point of describing Chi-
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na’s planned labor contribution to the war as an important symbol of
the country’s commitment to world peace – hence earning it the right
to be treated as an equal on the international stage once the war
ended.16 This specifically political use of Chinese labor overseas that
the Chinese government made at this time anticipated post-1949 Chi-
na’s use of overseas labor. Thus when the People’s Republic signed an
agreement with Tanzania in the late 1960s to help finance and build
the Tanzam Railroad with the aid of 15,000 Chinese technicians and
workers it was deliberately using this dramatic gesture of international
aid as a symbol of China’s political commitment to the non-aligned
world (and to Afro-Asian solidarity in particular). Such a parallel alone
indicates that the virtually forgotten story of Chinese indentured labor
in World War One France deserves to be revisited with a fresh perspec-
tive.
Notes
1 Note from Foreign Ministry to Ministry of Marine and Colonies (1863). Fonds minis-
te´riels/ge´ne´ralite´s: Carton 130, Dossier 1125. Centre d’archives d’outre-mer (Aix-en-Prov-
ence, France).
2 Fonds Clemenceau, 6N 130: Rapports des attache´s militaires. Archives de la service his-
torique de l’arme´e de terre (Chateau de Vincennes, Paris).
3 I have argued elsewhere that this modern French approach towards China drew on a
long tradition of cultural and intellectual relativism that dated from the sixteenth cen-
tury. See P. Bailey, ‘Voltaire and Confucius: French Attitudes Towards China in the
Early Twentieth Century’, History of European Ideas 14.6 (November 1992): 819-821.
4 Founded in 1907, the Association was one of a number of scholarly or semi-official
organizations established at this time to promote Franco-Chinese cultural relations.
5 Bulletin de l’association amicale franco-chinoise 1.1 (July 1917): 17-18.
6 Bulletin de l’association amicale franco-chinoise 3.3 (July 1911).
7 Lu¨’Ou jiaoyu yundong (The Educational Movement in Europe) (Tours: n.p., 1916): 82-
83. For another article Li wrote on the same theme in 1917, see Li Shizeng xiansheng
wenji (Collected Writings of Li Shizeng) (Taibei: Zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi
weiyuanhui, 1980), 1: 220-225.
8 The text of Aulard’s speech (translated into Chinese) is in Fufa qingong jianxue yun-
dong shiliao (Historical Materials on the Diligent Work and Frugal Study Movement
in France) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1979-1981), 1: 202-203.
9 Archives du ministe`re des affaires etrange`res (Paris), E-28-1/6.
10 Since western observations of the Chinese character often focused (and still do) on
the significant role of ‘face’ in Chinese personal interactions, this French obsession
with ‘face’ ironically provides another example of ‘cultural affinity’ between the two
countries (although not an example that contemporary French observers would ne-
cessarily have thought of).
11 Fonds Clemenceau, 6N 149: Mission de recrutement des ouvriers chinois. Archives
du service historique de l’arme´e de terre.
12 Archives nationales (Paris): F14 1131: Main-d’oeuvre exotique.
13 7N 2289: Affaires britanniques/travailleurs chinois. Archives du service historique de
l’arme´e de terre.
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14 La politique de Pe´kin (7 September, 1919).
15 La politique de Pe´kin (11 June, 1922).
16 The last few lines of a song dedicated to the Chinese workers in France and written
by a member of the Chinese official delegation at Versailles in 1919 also underlined
this point:
We, the children of sacred China, whose fate lies in heaven,
esteem the farmer and favor the artisan, but never resort to force.
Marching, marching ever marching.
All within the four seas are brothers.
We are an army of workers devoting ourselves to labor
in order to build peace for you, humanity.
La politique de Pe´kin (February 22, 1920).
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